Artemesia Family/Jared/Heroic Apology

The Apology (Jared) in Defense of Contemporary Heroism

I

I do recall, when I was still a knight of Fontan in the East Continent, of a young noble, no older than I, whose most defining characteristic was his tendency to advertise his self-proclaimed mantle "Hero of the Democracy", Armstrong Ironsides. The justifications for doing so are many, not least of which would likely be to inspire Fontanese into persevering into the multi-front war with Perdan, Caligus, the former Confederacy, Sirion, Old Rancagua, and Obsidian Islands. But with the knowledge of so many heroes past, who have lived and died in the classical heroic sense, I find it a difficult task to defend the actions of Armstrong, even if he is young.

But if I am to keep any sense of validity in my apology of Armstrong's advertisement of being the "Hero of the Democracy" (the word "the", I will devote a great amount of time to understanding in Part II before even attempting to press forward with my arguments) I would need to discount age as an absolute and confirming factor regarding logic. After all, I am no older than he, and far be it for me to criticize another's logic if I am in the same category.

To be relatively brief in my exposition of my apology, I would like to devote this first part to the analysis of classical heroism and how it applies to modern times. I also give my apologies (no pun intended, and furthermore these apologies are of the "I am sorry for the inconvenience caused to you" as opposed to the "I think this because of these reasons...' type) to Armstrong, who no doubt is aiding the war effort in Fontan despite any criticism he might face in the course of my arguments. I am certain he will understand why I have chosen him as an excellent model to frame my defense.

Some ancient thinkers held the notion that the pure human form would be governed solely by virtues. One notable example was a famous student of a rather radical (at the time) thinker who was executed for his inflammatory views. This student provided the framework for the classical view of virtues and by continuation, heroism. To the ancients, heroism was dependent on a collection of virtues, but the simple sum of all the characteristics did not constitute all that was heroism. A list could be compiled of characteristics of heroism, based on the virtues that governed them, but virtues themselves were uncategorizeable by the simple addition of the collection of traits representative of each virtue. Hence, we could say that heroism is governed by courage, which entails being brave, or being resolute, or any number of traits that we could ascribe to courage ad infinitum without ever coming closer to the definition of what courage is. However, I will leave that aside for the philosophers of moral virtues. For the sake of brevity, I will call each virtue simply by name, and take it as a given that there is a general set of actions and ideas associated with each virtue, such that it distinguishes among the different virtues.

Heroism is also characterized by justice, and in the ancient schools of thought, this was based on the notion of the truth, of performing the good, but no satisfactory definition of justice has ever arisen. Here I would like to remind readers not to be discouraged or dismissive of the ancient philosophers, or the modern ones, none of whom have found satisfactory definitions for such terms as "justice" or "virtue" or "heroism". It could very well be that we might see as many characteristics of each, from now until the end of the world, and still be unable to provide a universal definition.

But moving along our topic of classical heroism, the traits associated with such a category that made a follower and advocate of heroism a "hero" were the virtues, and indeed, all virtues, for any less and the classical ideal hero would fail, as has been painfully told in the heroic verses of the mighty virtuous man who was made nearly immortal, who, due to one small weakness, was killed after having angered a god. Clearly, a small slip in virtue leads to a sudden, dramatic, and irreversible fall from heroism. The classical definition also adds the Herois Paradox, "To achieve immortality, one must die heroically". While it is clear that this form of "immortality" did not refer to everlasting physical lifespan, it added an interesting notion that would be conserved even into modern heroism. That is, heroes are much more prone to dying, and such deaths are commemorated with extensive and highly publicized funerals. Some heroes are forever recorded in human history, and thus immortalizing them to some degree.

I am not convinced, however, that classical heroism always entailed death in battle. In the so-called "Age of Heroes", as so romanticized in fictional stories, a hero could retire after at least one grand series of trials that tested every one of his virtues. Having survived all trials and proving his virtues, the hero would be formally secured as "heroic" and would then have the luxury of retiring to wherever he so pleased, so long as he maintained his heroism. I would say that heroism did not always concern matters of battle, or even conflict, as has been the most prevalent way of portraying heroism in classical literature. Ancient authors most commonly described a hero in the context of performing a heroic action whilst in the middle of conflict. But for those heroes who do not die virtuously in battle, what of them? Surely we cannot be so irrational as to say that virtues do not exist at all times that one possesses them? Because heroism is a resultant of the virtues, it is my belief that as long as the virtues remain intact, a hero remains a hero, regardless of the setting. This also entails that heroism is dictated not by actions, but through virtues.

I have now concluded that classical heroism is an entity wholly dependent on the virtues of a hero, and not on his actions. An action can certainly be contrary to a virtue, but according to this model, the "contrary to virtue" would be the deciding factor that destroys heroism, rather than the action. We can now proceed to the next consideration of the first part, the modern views of heroism.

Very little will be actually dedicated to the modern view, as it is constantly evolving, and because I will more effectively present it through my arguments throughout this apology. In a general sense, there are two major philosophical areas regarding modern heroism. One is a derivative of the classical heroism, which still holds priority of virtue over actions, and maintains that it is the nature of a hero to be heroic, rather than the actions which cause heroic actions, to make him a hero. These "classicists" argue that a heroic nature automatically dictates that any actions taken would also be heroic, and any diversion from nature would result in a contradiction of nature, thus a contradiction in virtue, and thus a complete and utter destruction of heroism in the subject. The other major school of thought, the "activists", think that actions dictate more of what heroism entails. Their stance argues that virtue is so poorly understood that one cannot rationally and reliably understand, i.e. "quantify", what constitutes heroism based on virtuous nature alone. To remedy this supposed shortcoming, the activists generally proposed that heroism be accounted for through analysis of the sum actions a "hero" has done in his lifetime. The "neo-heroics" would posit that their maxim for determining what qualified someone to be a hero is "A set of actions that lead to a greater good than the projected result of the alternative actions". But immediately we can see where there would be much contention in this maxim. This would mean that a cowardly pickpocket, who otherwise has no sense of virtue, or even what it means to be a hero, in any form of its conception, could, through the neo-heroics' definition, be considered a hero if he chanced to rob all the money from the leader of an army that was bent on the destruction of the world, and through that action, put the evil leader into bankruptcy and foiled his plans to destroy the world. Neo-heroics would be quick to point out that the action requires rational volition, and I would still say that the pickpocket was doing the action quite voluntarily, and that the rationality of such an action would be inextricably linked to volition.

A less radical group of the modern activists take a compromised view of both sides. They believe in some ideas of classical heroism's "virtuous definition" but add the qualification that in order to be considered a hero, one's actions need also be virtuous. However, unlike the classicists, the modernists do not think that heroic actions are necessarily inextricably tied to heroic virtues. Instead, they believe that the opposite could be true in some cases. An example is the retired war hero who has become a pacifist and dedicated his life to peace, and whose ruler calls him back to the frontlines. He knows that the next mission he will be assigned to is a suicide mission and that there is a very high chance that he will not survive. However, he also has taken a sacred vow to never raise a hand in violence again. The classicist view I find, would be hard-pressed to decide whether loyalty to the ruler, and hence a strong loyalty to one's oath, or loyalty to one's idea, hence one's self-oath, takes more precedence. The neo-heroics would likely opt for the former option, seeing as how their stance would be towards the more externalist view, in that withholding one's capacity to perform heroic actions is contrary to heroism whereas betraying one's ideals does not lead to negative effects for the greater whole. The neo-heroic view, then, can best be classified as a individual-destructive view, whereas the classicists hold an individual-conservative view. The modernists have devised a system to weigh the two options according to statistics and analysis of one's nature. They would say that such a decision must be based on how much good the individual, in joining the war effort, would bring, whether his choice should be made universal, whether in not joining he is causing a significant effect to the effort as a whole, what adverse effects would result from him betraying his personal beliefs, and whether such effects would in any way affect his ability in combat. The modernist view seeks to come to a conclusion through a vast extraction of considerations and a linear analysis of each situation. However, the end result is still the same, as some modernist scholarly critics have presented in their works.

As a final note in the first part, the modern view of heroism is a very hotly debated forum of ever-changing ideas. However, I believe that in taking one example, we might come to similar conclusions of what modern heroism must always entail, or must always not entail.

II

Armstrong Ironsides declared himself a hero of Fontan shortly after the fallout from the secession of Fontan City. It was quite clear soon enough, that he considered himself not only a hero of a democracy called Fontan, but in fact, he likely considered himself the hero of the democracy of Fontan. While I cannot say whether he truly felt that way, I can only say what i interpret his words to be. And in fact, it is often the biographer whose interpretations take precedence over, and even become, the subject's thoughts. This is a rather interesting fact, and one might be able to find the rare manuscript of a monk named Joseph, who wrote a discourse on the phenomenon of retroactively transformable historical scholarship.

But I am not here to give a history lesson, or a biography, and for convenience, I will portray Armstrong as faithfully as I can recall him, and in instances where I cannot, he shall become an impromptu fictional character based on an actual person, a literary technique that has been extensively (and quite excessively) examined in Bertrauser's tome of the said technique in ancient myths and legends.

To examine Armstrong's signature, "Hero of the Democracy", we immediately notice "the Democracy". To be fair, Fontan is the only democracy of its kind on the continent, and although it is unlikely that no other realm in the world has ever had a similar or identical system, it is entirely possible to write this off towards Armstrong's ignorance of the larger world (I mean no offense to the real Armstrong, as understandably, he would recognize that I have taken liberties of portraying him as a character of my example out of convenience). With that out of the way, I can analyze the form of "hero" that Armstrong refers to.

There is no doubt that Armstrong knows that he is not the only hero of Fontan, as the Duke of Krimml Amelia died a hero to protect her city from invasion. But this provides an interesting point. If there were more than one hero of Fontan, what would be the purpose of expressly calling oneself essentially "Hero of Fontan"? For if that were the case, then noble A, noble B, and noble C, who have all declared themselves also heroes of Fontan would also call themselves, "Hero of Fontan". And in such a case we can see where there will be problems as a result. Is there any difference between A's "Hero of Fontan" and B's "Hero of Fontan"? If there is none, as the category of "heroes of Fontan" are nominally equivalent, then the purpose of the title has little utility. If this referred to a select group of people who fit the definition of hero, whatever it might be, then there would be no problem with this title, as "Hero of Fontan" would thus be an objective category of a specific group. However, it is Armstrong who calls himself "Hero of the Democracy", and no further justification has been made of this distinction. If he is to be taken as a "Hero of the Democracy" in and of itself, in an absolute and objective sense, and not as a title without meaning, then he must fit the definition of a "hero".

For the purposes of this apology, I will make the initial assumption that Armstrong is a hero in the absolute sense, and from there, work through the different definitions of heroism that have been provided throughout history, to see if there are any contradictions that would make one definition invalid, and to determine where the common grounds between the schools of though lie, such that a composite of common features for heroism can be made to better understand what better constitutes the best contemporary model of heroism.

First, if Armstrong were examined in the classicist view of heroism, then his virtues would be the determining factors of his heroic existence. According to the ancient views from which classicism has taken its foundation, his nature would show whether he was virtuous and his actions would be inevitably towards virtuous ones. Any deviation would result in an immediate and irreversible cancellation of the heroic status.

From Armstrong's actions, I know that he has bravely entered into many battles in the name of Fontan. As he is a "Hero of the Democracy" then I can only assume that his oaths are to the external Fontan and the internal notion of democracy. In either case, he is fulfilling his loyalty by fighting enemies of both, to preserve both Fontan and democracy. All things considered, his actions can all be categorized under heroic in the neo-heroic label. Everything he does is spent on doing what is for the better alternative in the subjective hero's case: Protecting Fontan, vis, democracy. But the neo-heroic view does not account for intentions nor does it analyze properly any actions negative to the heroic condition. Namely, actions that would affect one's capacity to perform future heroic actions, which are at present considered perfectly within the bounds of heroism by the neo-heroic view, but which in the future will lead to a contradiction in activity of the neo-heroic view. Therefore, I will not spend too much time examining the validity of neo-heroism as a successful test of Armstrong's heroism.

The statement "Hero of the Democracy" is unintentionally sending a message to the other heroes of Fontan, as well as those who would not consider themselves heroes. It is sending a message that Armstrong believes very strongly that he is a hero, and in order to recognize themselves also as heroes, it puts pressure on the other heroes of Fontan to also call themselves "Hero of the Democracy", but once more we can see where this would lead to difficulties. Furthermore, Armstrong has yet to provide a rational justification of why he is qualified in calling himself "Hero of the Democracy", and of what viewpoint he is a hero, whether classical or one of the modern views. If he took on a wholly neo-heroic approach, then his self-designation would be completely valid for the present, up until some future whereby the possibility exists that enough other nobles get dissatisfied based on a misinterpretation of his title to mean that he places himself above the other heroes, that his act of calling himself a hero is actually detracting from his goals.

In the modernist sense, then, one would have to weigh how much, if any, the self-designated title "Hero of the Democracy" affects the rest of the nobles in the realm. A negligible morale drop due to dissent would be overlooked by modernist theory, but a large amount of dissatisfaction over such a perceived arrogance would lead to a significant distraction, and the capacity for heroism in Armstrong would thus be adversely affected.

The modernist view also takes into account that Armstrong likely intended to inspire his peers by hailing the democracy, by placing himself as an object of leadership by example. This would have been quickly reviled in classicist circles as an example of excessive hubris, which led to the downfall of many a hero in classical literature. However, modernist and even some classicist thinkers have allowed that a certain degree of hubris is required to recognize oneself as a hero, and that otherwise one could never realize his own heroism. The difference between the two views is that modernist theory seeks to quantify hubris to set a standard at which one can be arrogant and remain in bounds of heroic nature. Classicists say that the hubris extends only so far as it allows the self to recognize heroism, and nothing more. By the standards of classicist theory, Armstrong would be incorrect in calling himself "Hero of the Democracy" because by stating it publicly, the intention of such an action is not to only recognize the self as a hero, but also to state it such that others might also recognize it. If the only intention was to recognize the self as a hero, then there would be no need to announce it publicly, because the self does not need to be informed in a public environment.

Modernist evaluations of Armstrong's actions in regards to heroism are far more complicated to resolve. It deals with a very large number of factors, more so than the neo-heroics would consider, and attempt to link each factor with the virtuous nature. I will continue the discussion of the modernist evaluation in Part III.